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Full Idea
It may be that all 'knowledge' attributions have the same truth conditions, but people apply contextually varying standards. The most plausible standard for truth is very high, but not unreachably high.
Gist of Idea
Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards
Source
Earl Conee (Contextualism Contested (and reply) [2005], 'Loose')
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd ed)', ed/tr. Steup/Turri/Sosa [Wiley Blackwell 2014], p.65
A Reaction
This is the 'invariantist' alternative to contextualism about knowledge. Is it a standard 'for truth'? Either it is or it isn't true, so there isn't a standard. I take the standard to concern the justification.
| 19555 | People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee] |
| 19557 | Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee] |
| 19556 | Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee] |
| 12890 | That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee] |
| 12892 | Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee] |
| 19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
| 19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
| 19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
| 19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |